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FEAR OF COMMUNISM—NAZIS' LAST HOPE FOR SOFT PEACE

THE closer the Allies come to victory over the Axis in Europe, the more we are forced to realize what should have been obvious all along—that the end of hostilities will only mark the beginning of seismic readjustments in a continent torn by war and civil strife, involving revision, sometimes from day to day, of the theories and preconceptions many of us have developed about European affairs. The paramount need for wartime cooperation had clamped the lid tight on divergences among the United Nations regarding the post-war world. Germany's military defeat is bound to spring open a Pandora's box of troubles from the Atlantic to the Black Sea.

END OF WAR WILL RAISE NEW PROBLEMS. The prospect of post-war ferment may dishearten those Americans who have long believed that Europe was incurably addicted to intrigues and wars. It is, in this respect, fortunate that unrest in the Asiatic colonies controlled by Western powers and the rise of nationalism throughout South America give evidence that political, economic and social conflicts are not limited to Europe. But it is there that the United Nations will experience the first test of their ability to work together in peace as they have done in war. The Dumbarton Oaks Conference represents a determined attempt by the four great powers to devise international machinery to avert future wars. This conference, however, is not empowered to deal with the problems of political change, immediate relief, and long-term reconstruction which, next to liberation, head the priority list of liberated nations. The manifold issues raised by the as yet unsettled Russo-Polish controversy, the surrender of Finland on September 4, Rumania's claims against Hungary—just to mention a few—reveal the need, more urgent than ever, of a conference of all the United Nations or at least the creation, as suggested by the British, of a United Nations Com-

mission for Europe supplementing, or preferably replacing, the European Advisory Commission on which the United States, Britain and Russia alone are represented. As in France, so elsewhere, people will not have much time to waste on jubilant victory parades. They are eager to get down to the task of rebuilding their shattered institutions and disorganized economies, and the most constructive thing the United States, Britain and Russia can do is to help them in this task.

EUROPE MUST SHARE IN DECISIONS ON GERMANY. The efficacy of the aid rendered by the great powers will necessarily depend on the manner in which, as well as the objects for which, it is offered. The reconstruction of Europe cannot be effectively undertaken by the great powers unless they have the voluntary cooperation of the liberated countries. Discussion of what comes first—agreement among the great powers, or agreement between the great powers and the small nations—threatens to become as tenuous as the medieval debate about the number of angels on the point of a needle. Whatever may seem desirable in theory, in practice it is unimaginable that the countries of Europe, with France once more emerging as their acknowledged leader and spokesman, can long be left sitting on the doorstep while the great powers discuss the future of the continent, and especially the key problem of what to do about Germany. The report that representatives of France are to join the Dumbarton Oaks conferees on September 10 are encouraging. For to Germany's neighbors its fate is not merely a provocative subject for forum debates—it is a matter of life and death. We in this country who have been spared the horrors of Lidice and Lublin, who have not lived at the mercy of the Gestapo, who have not seen those we love dragged out of our homes for deportation, torture or execution, have a heavy responsibility

for whatever judgments we may reach concerning Germany and its relations with the rest of Europe, and the world.

There is no need for us to fan hatred against the Germans. The hatred expressed by the people of Florence has been echoed in every country subjected to Nazi rule. What we must be on guard to avoid is commiseration with the Germans in the hour of their defeat. Harsh as the Allies' demand for "unconditional surrender" may have appeared at the time it was made, conditions on the continent revealed in the wake of invasion should convince even the most doubtful that no other approach to the Germans is practicable at this moment. The few Germans who have been in a position publicly to dissociate themselves from the Nazis—notably the generals who joined the Free German Committee in Moscow—lend strength to a policy of no compromise. The burden of their statements is not remorse for the sufferings inflicted by the Germans on Europe, but regret that, through a series of tactical errors attributed to Hitler and his Nazi advisers, as distinguished from the professional soldiers of the General Staff, Germany failed to achieve its military objectives. We need not despair of finding Germans, after the war, with whom it may prove possible to establish satisfactory working relationships. But in fairness to the millions of Europe who have perished in the unceasing struggle against the Nazis, and to our own dead as well, the nature of such relationships should be stated to the Germans only after their military defeat has been consummated on their own soil, and after their military, as well as political leaders, have surrendered without any previous promises or commitments on our part.

This does not mean that the United Nations themselves should abstain from formulating their plans concerning Germany until military victory has been achieved. On the contrary, they should do so as swiftly as possible, for their decisions about Germany's future will shape all other developments on the continent. In this critical hour, when the hopes of so

many so long oppressed have suddenly been renewed, the Nazis still have a valuable card up their sleeve which they are playing with all the ingenuity at their disposal. They argue once more that Germany has fought and bled not to advance its own national interests at the expense of weaker countries, but out of sheer altruism, to save Europe from Bolshevism. Much as the course of events during the past five years has discredited this argument, it retains sufficient influence over the minds of some people in all countries to give the Nazis at least the hope that it may swing the balance in favor of Germany in the very hour of defeat.

IDEOLOGICAL DEBATE CONTINUES. The form in which the latest version of the "crusade against Bolshevism" is being presented is not new. The Nazis are taking advantage of the views expressed by some strong anti-Nazi spokesmen who, while highly critical of the Hitler system, at the same time assert that a fundamental and allegedly irreconcilable conflict exists between Christianity and Communism, and that the defeat of Germany may merely assure domination of Europe either directly by Russia or, indirectly, by elements inspired by Communist doctrines. These spokesmen show a marked tendency, that early Christians might have questioned, of making private property an intrinsic attribute of Christianity. To the millions in Europe who, under conditions of unspeakable suffering, struggled for liberty irrespective of the loss of property the thesis that a conflict exists between Christianity plus private property on the one hand, and Communism on the other, may appear unconvincing. The Nazi argument, however, which continues to play on fear of Communism, is not addressed to the victims of German conquest. It is addressed primarily to the United States where, Hitler's propagandists hope, the desire to protect private property from the possible depredations of Communism might yet soften the terms imposed on Germany.

The ideological debate of our times is by no means over, Mr. Churchill's declaration notwithstanding. It is merely entering another phase. In essence it raises the question whether the end of the war will see Europe moving to the Left—and thus, seemingly at least, toward Russia; or to the Right—on the assumption, current in some quarters, that the United States and Britain would prefer conservative forces to be in the ascendant. This question can be answered only by re-examining anew Russia's objectives and policies in Europe; the stake of the Western democracies in that continent; and the temper of the liberated peoples.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

(This is the first of a series of four articles on Europe's problems as seen from the United States.)

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
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Washington News Letter



PHILLIPS INCIDENT INDICATES U.S. CONCERN WITH FUTURE OF INDIA

From the day this country entered the war against the Axis, the United States government, regarding the Allied coalition as an essential union to be vigilantly maintained, has sought to avoid taking direct steps that would embarrass its Allies. For this reason it has suppressed any temptation to acquaint Britain formally with the existence of public opinion here favoring freedom for India. In keeping with that policy, President Roosevelt took no action on criticism of Britain made to him in a report on May 14, 1943 by William Phillips, his personal ambassador to India, who reported that the Indian Army and people would not participate "with any force in the war" until they received a promise of liberty on a specific date.

ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS DISTURBED. Congressional comment following revelations concerning this report on July 25 by Drew Pearson, Washington newspaperman, has now in some measure frustrated the objectives of the President's policy by disturbing Anglo-American relations. On July 19, 1944 Phillips wrote Secretary of State Cordell Hull that he wished to retire from his post as political adviser to Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander for the Western European Offensive, which he had taken temporarily after his return from India. The fact that the State Department postponed announcement of Phillips' return until two weeks after publication of the letter inspired charges that the diplomat was withdrawing because wide knowledge of its contents had rendered him unacceptable to the British government.

Through a State Department denial that Phillips was coming home because he was *persona non grata* in London, the United States government promptly expressed its formal intention of continuing the policy of not embarrassing an ally. After the letter's publication, however, Sir Olaf Caroe, of the Department of External Affairs in New Delhi, had telegraphed the India Office in London that it "is impossible for us to do other than regard [Phillips] as *persona non grata* and we could not again receive him," although he still bears the designation of the President's personal representative in India. However, on August 31 the Earl of Halifax, British Ambassador in Washington, denied that Phillips was considered *persona non grata* in London.

These strong denials failed to curb Congressional

critics. On August 30 Representative Calvin D. Johnson of Illinois, Republican member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, introduced a resolution asking that Sir Ronald Campbell, British Minister in Washington, and Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, Indian Agent General in Washington, be declared *persona non grata* "should they continue in their efforts to mold public opinion in the Phillips case." On the following day Chairman Bloom of the House Foreign Affairs Committee renewed the denial of any connection between Phillips' resignation from Eisenhower's staff and publication of his letter. Nevertheless, on September 2 Senator Albert B. Chandler of Kentucky charged that British officials "put obstacles in the way" of Phillips' work "as soon as they found out" about the letter, and he thereupon made public the Caroe telegram.

OTHER CRITICISMS OF INDIAN POLICY

The British government's anxiety to deny that it had forced Phillips' recall is based in some degree on a wish to protect the principle of nonintervention by one government in the affairs of another. Whether the United States will observe this principle with respect to India after the war in Europe is over appears questionable. India is an important base in the war against Japan, and the United States may show even greater interest in Indian affairs when the struggle in Asia becomes our major military problem.

Moreover, general comments made during the war, but not brought formally to British attention, by officials and special agents of the government in Washington on the advisability of granting freedom to colonial possessions suggest that the United States will officially concern itself with this problem at the peace table. In November 1942 President Roosevelt said that the history of the Philippine Islands, whose independence has been promised by the United States for 1946, "provides a pattern" for the evolution of colonial areas toward liberty. On March 21, 1944 Secretary of State Cordell Hull said that imperial powers should "help the aspiring peoples to develop materially and educationally; to prepare themselves for the duties and responsibilities of self-government to attain liberty." And in June, shortly before leaving on his trip to China, Vice President Henry Wallace proposed that the "trustees" of colonial areas in Asia announce dates for the beginning of independence

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and self-government. Thrusting aside in advance possible objections, that American interest might amount to intervention, he explained that "it is important that America have a positive policy toward

this area . . . because in Southeast Asia there are conflicting forces in operation that have in them the seeds of future wars."

BLAIR BOLLES

THE F.P.A. BOOKSHELF

India's Problem Can Be Solved, by DeWitt Mackenzie. New York, Doubleday, Doran, 1943. \$3.00

Journalistic discussion of the background of the Indian question and developments centering about the Cripps Mission. Mr. Mackenzie has no ready-made solution to offer and is well aware of the difficulty of reaching an agreement. But he holds the firm belief that Hindus and Moslems can, and usually do, get along together. He also stresses the part that a provisional government could play in further mobilizing wartime India in the struggle against Japan.

The Indian Problem: Report on the Constitutional Problem in India, by R. Coupland. New York, Oxford University Press, 1944. \$5.00. (Consists of three volumes, bound as one: I. *The Indian Problem, 1833-1935*; II. *Indian Politics, 1936-1942*; III. *The Future of India*.)

This British account constitutes an exhaustive treatment of various Indian constitutional questions and adds much to our factual knowledge of the subject. The author, a member of the Cripps Mission, presents what is essentially an official view of the Indian situation. His main emphasis is on the conflict between Hindus and Moslems and the necessity of the Indians "getting together" before the constitutional problem can be settled. He also presents a plan for the regional organization of India.

Peoples of India, by William H. Gilbert, Jr. Washington, Smithsonian Institute, 1944. (War Background Studies, No. 18.)

A brief discussion of the geography of India, its cultures, races, castes and tribes. The material presented is in itself informative, but greatly overstates one side of India, namely, its diversity. Indian nationalism, so essential to an understanding of the "peoples of India," is virtually ignored. In fact, the work of the Indian National Congress is summed up in a single inadequate phrase: "The largest and most influential political group and favoring independence."

Subject India, by Henry Noel Brailsford. New York, John Day, 1943. \$2.50

A distinguished British author argues for the complete independence of India, declaring: "We must hand over the reality of power to an Indian national government now, and clear the road to independence by withdrawing our support of the princes." The book is important not only for its careful discussion of Indian affairs, but also because it indicates the existence in Britain of a portion of public opinion that is critical of official policy.

The "Bombay Plan" for India's Economic Development. New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1944. (Mimeographed for private distribution.)

The full text of a plan which has given rise to considerable comment in the United States and Britain. Drawn up by a group of Indian industrialists, it suggests not only the great economic development of which India is capable, but also the determination of many Indian business leaders to reorganize Indian economy.

Voiceless India, by Gertrude Emerson. New York, John Day, 1944. \$3.00

A revised edition of an invaluable account of Indian village life, first published in 1930. Written with deep sympathy for and understanding of the Indian people by a Western woman who went to live in the "Village of Five Trees."

Revolution in India, by Frances Gunther. New York, Island Press, 1944. \$1.00

A critical commentary on British policy in India, expressing the view that "a gigantic struggle of heroic proportions" is going on between "the English will to rule and the Indian will to freedom."

Asia's Lands and Peoples, by George B. Cressey. New York, McGraw-Hill, 1944. \$6.00

A comprehensive survey of the Asiatic continent and adjoining areas, with special emphasis on China, the Soviet Union, Japan and India. Professor Cressey, a distinguished geographer, has synthesized in this volume the work of many years. His approach is a broad one, based on the view that "geography deals with all the items that give personality to the face of the earth."

I See a New China, by George Hogg. Boston, Little, Brown, 1944. \$2.50

An organizer for the Chinese Industrial Cooperatives presents in these pages a vigorous account of the conflict between old and new ways of life in China. A small book, but full of shrewd insights into Chinese conditions.

Chiang Kai-shek: Asia's Man of Destiny, by H. H. Chang. New York, Doubleday, Doran, 1944. \$3.50

A biography of the Generalissimo drawn largely from his own writings and speeches and from materials reflecting the official Chinese point of view. The author pictures Chiang Kai-shek as a leader who wishes to join the industrial techniques of the twentieth century to the social philosophy of Confucius.

The Road to Teheran, by Foster Rhea Dulles. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1944. \$2.50

A short history of the 150 years of peaceful relations between Russia and the United States. The author wisely refrains from drawing lessons for the future, but he does establish the "parallelism" of the foreign policies of the two nations during the greater part of that history despite the divergent political systems in each country.

The Nazis Go Underground, by Curt Riess. New York, Doubleday, Doran, 1944. \$2.50

An argument that the plans the Nazis have laid for their post-war underground organization can be frustrated only by a German revolution from the Left.

Invasion Diary, by Richard Tregaskis. New York, Random House, 1944. \$2.75

The author of *Guadalcanal Diary* does a competent, interesting and sympathetic story of the invasion of Sicily and southern Italy, particularly in his picture of hospitalized casualties.

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